"The lobbying strategy is to keep excise as low as possible" - tobacco industry excise taxation policy in Ukraine by Krasovsky, Konstantin S
RESEARCH Open Access
“The lobbying strategy is to keep excise as low as
possible” - tobacco industry excise taxation policy
in Ukraine
Konstantin S Krasovsky
Abstract
Background: Tobacco taxes are one of the most effective ways to reduce tobacco use. Transnational tobacco
companies (TTCs) claim they wish to develop and secure excise systems that benefit both governments and the
profitability of the companies themselves. The objective of the paper is to use the case of Ukraine, with its
inconsistent history of excise tax changes in 1992-2008, to explore tobacco industry taxation strategies and tactics,
and their implications for governmental revenues.
Methods: Details of tobacco industry policy on tobacco taxation in Ukraine were obtained by searching tobacco
industry internal documents and various published reports.
Results: Even before entering the market in Ukraine, TTCs had made efforts to change the excise system in the
country. In 1993-1994, TTCs lobbied the Ukrainian Government, and succeeded in achieving a lowering in tobacco
tax. This, however, did not produce revenue increase they promised the Government. In 1996-1998, Ukrainian
authorities increased excise several times, ignoring the wishes of TTCs, caused significant growth in revenue. Due
to TTCs lobbying activities in 1999-2007 the tax increases were very moderate and it resulted in increased tobacco
consumption in Ukraine. In 2008, despite the TTCs position, excise rates were increased twice and it was very
beneficial for revenues.
Conclusions: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control includes provisions both on tobacco taxation policy
and on protection of public health policy from vested interests of tobacco industry. This paper provides arguments
why tobacco taxation policy should also be protected from vested interests of tobacco industry. TTCs taxation
strategy appears to be consistent: keep excise as low as possible. Apparent conflicts between TTCs concerning tax
structures often hide their real aim to change tax structures for competing interests without increasing total tax
incidence. Governments, that aim to reduce levels of tobacco use, should not allow tobacco companies to
influence the development and implementation of tobacco taxation policy.
Background
Tobacco taxation is the most effective way to reduce
tobacco use, especially among young people. As an addi-
tional benefit for governments, tax increases provide
increased revenues [1]. When the Soviet Union col-
lapsed each of the newly independent states introduced
some kind of market reform. For the tobacco industry,
market reform meant that state-controlled tobacco
enterprises could be privatised and tobacco excise
taxation should be introduced. Several publications [2-5]
described the process of tobacco industry privatisation
in the Former Soviet Union countries by transnational
tobacco companies (TTCs) with widespread implications
for tobacco control across the world.
TTCs investments in Ukraine started in 1993, when
the British-American Tobacco (BAT) acquired 65% of
the Priluky tobacco factory. A detailed description of
these investments is presented in [6]. Most major TTCs
(BAT, Philip Morris, RJR-JTI and Imperial Tobacco-
Reemtsma) are present in Ukraine and, since 1994, they
control more than 90% of tobacco market. In Ukraine, Correspondence: krasovskyk@gmail.com
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Tobacco taxation policy is a key element of an
evidence-based and comprehensive national tobacco
control programme. The Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) states that price and tax mea-
sures are an effective and important means of reducing
tobacco consumption. The FCTC also urges that in set-
ting and implementing their public health policies with
respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect
these policies from commercial and other vested inter-
ests of the tobacco industry.
TTCs claim they have detailed expertise on tobacco
taxation and can help governments to establish optimal
excise rates. In 1993, BAT’s managing director Ulrich
Herter in his speech to the World Tobacco Symposium
in Moscow, claimed: “It is a fact, little appreciated out-
side the industry and the governments we deal with that,
in addition to all our other skills, we engage in one of
the world’s “oldest professions”, tax collection. Not only
do we collect excise but we also advise and set up
schemes in many countries, that will deliver to their gov-
ernments the revenues they need in a predictable and
orderly way“ [7]. In 1998 the BAT claimed its aim was:
“to develop and secure excise systems that benefit both
governments and the company“ [8].
Back in the mid-1980 s, excise taxes became an
increasingly urgent issue for the tobacco industry, lead-
ing it to formulate strategies and to assemble arguments
to oppose excise tax increases [9]. Research revealed
that TTCs managed to persuade governments to keep
low tobacco taxes in Finland,[10] Hungary,[11] Uzbeki-
stan [12] and other countries.
T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h ep a p e ri st ou s et h ec a s eo f
Ukraine with its inconsistent history of excise tax
changes in 1992-2008 to explore how the tobacco indus-
try seeks to advance its vested interests through involve-
ment in the development of tobacco taxation policies,
and in the implications for government revenues.
Methods
An understanding of the tobacco industry’si n t e r e s ti n
tobacco taxation in Ukraine was obtained by searching
in 2003-2009 the tobacco industry internal documents
at http://tobaccodocuments.org and http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu. The methods have been described in detail in
[2-5,13], and consisted primarily of online searching
using search terms including Ukraine, Ukr, tax, excise
and others in a broad and iterative approach. Initially
several thousand documents were found, but to make
the search more specific the following categories of
documents were considered as ineligible: 1) documents
with information on excise in other countries, but other
issues in Ukraine; 2) documents on excise in other
countries, where Ukraine is used just for comparison; 3)
excerpts of legislation and other documents where tax
rates and regulations are just presented; 4) newspaper
articles, where tobacco industry position is not men-
tioned. Finally the search retrieved 240 files (many of
which were duplicates), which had some information on
tobacco industry positions and attitudes to tobacco taxa-
tion. From 240 files after excluding all kinds of dupli-
cates (translations into Ukrainian, several versions of
one document, etc) over 60 documents were studied in
detail. Documents were indexed in a database which
enabled the sorting of documents by date and topic to
construct a historical and thematic narrative. Supple-
mentary data were obtained from the tobacco control
media monitoring database, which was established in
2000 as part of activities of the Tobacco Control
Resource Centre for the Russian-speaking countries (see
http://www.adic.org.ua/adic), statistical data and other
published reports.
To present the outcomes of the taxation policy varia-
tions, inflation-adjusted revenue levels based of the offi-
cial statistics data were calculated.
Results
1992: Creating the taxation climate prior to starting
investments
In 1992, just before starting investments in Ukraine,
BAT manager Paul Brigham issued an internal docu-
ment titled “Key Area Paper. Excise Taxation of Tobacco
Products“,[14] where he set out BAT’s taxation policy
aim “To manage the cigarette excise taxation issue in
order to establish the most appropriate retail price struc-
ture whilst optimising profitability and cash flow over
the long term”. This policy was set out to be achieved by
focusing upon several main strategies. The first strategy
was: “Seek to reduce excise taxation or to ensure that its
level does not increase at a rate greater than inflation“.
One of the arguments supporting this strategy was that
“increases in taxation may result in a decline in con-
sumption sufficient to bring about a fall in revenue yield
to the Government”. However Brigham himself ques-
tioned this argument “Because of the inelasticity of
demand for cigarettes over the longer term, this result
rarely occurs“. In 1993 Philip Morris (PM) formulated
an almost identical taxation strategy to “Seek to mini-
mize the total tax burden on cigarettes in all instances“
and “ensure that retail price increases do not exceed
inflation“ [15].
Before starting investments in Ukraine, BAT devel-
oped a detailed business plan. It was based on market
estimates in 1991 of a total Ukrainian cigarette market
of about 65 billion cigarette, while the estimated market
potential was 80-85 billion cigarettes [16]. BAT manager
Anton van Waay commented: “If this market demand is
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whether this theoretical demand will not disappear” and
to satisfy the demand “what is needed is a strategy for
excise and tax” [17]. He also indicated that “cigarettes
are extremely cheap in Ukraine” [18] and suggested
“Would it not be better to have a strategy aimed at a
low excise on plain, a mix structure of specific/ad
valorem a la West Europe, but a lower total tax bur-
den?” [19]. The business plan for Ukraine stated “As a
precondition to BAT’s involvement in the Ukraine, the
excise system must be changed” [16] Another document
reports about the meeting to discuss “whether the
authorities would be amenable to an approach to discuss
and advise on excise structures” [20]. At the meeting it
was concluded that “it is essential that there are excise
systems within which we can work, and it is strongly pre-
ferable that they should provide a Framework within
which we can make a profit“.
While requiring changes to the excise taxation
system, TTCs actually seemed ready to invest without
such changes [21]. BAT managing director Herter
wrote “Excise structure changes are necessary and
whilst attempts will be made to change the structure
immediately, it is recognised that it might not be possi-
ble to effect such changes before an acquisition takes
place“ [22].
1993-1994: successful lobbying of tax rates decrease
Just before the TTCs acquisition of the first tobacco fac-
tory in Ukraine, excise taxes on cigarettes were
increased to 70% of ex-factory price both for filter and
non-filter cigarettes. Since May 1992, when the BAT
Business Plan was prepared, the prices of cigarettes have
doubled in real terms [23]. BAT manager Anne Johnson
commented: “Although the increase in excise rates is
substantial, the rates are now not substantially different
from those in neighbouring countries“ [23]. She also
mentioned: “The new excise rates will have an impact
on the anticipated volumes and therefore on the profit-
ability of the project. However, overall the project
remains financially extremely attractive“.
In June 1993, BAT’s chairman Patrick Sheehy wrote a
letter to the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk,[24]
where he described his perspective on the tobacco mar-
ket in Ukraine. “At the present time, cigarette production
has declined by some 50%. The consequence of this is
that consumer demand for cigarettes is not being satis-
fied. The inevitable result is that the Republic’s revenue
from excise and tax is not meeting the forecasts”.M r .
Sheehy indicated that “This situation is attributable to
the amount and structure of the excise introduced this
year... overall total burden or level of taxation on cigar-
ettes is high with the result that cigarettes are becoming
unaffordable to the majority of consumers in Ukraine”.
Then Mr. Sheehy quite forthrightly suggested to the
President of Ukraine “I would therefore suggest that the
amount of excise be re-examined and lowered”.A n d
it was not just a suggestion, but a submitted proposal,
as Sheehy wrote: “I have been informed that the Ministry
of Food, which is responsible for the tobacco industry,
has already submitted detailed proposals for a change in
the excise structure. I would, Mr. President, be most
grateful if you would support these proposals for a
change in excise so that the difficulties which the indus-
try is currently facing in Ukraine can be alleviated
as soon as possible”. These proposals were developed
with the assistance of the author of BAT’s taxation
strategy [23].
The BAT proposal seemed to be favourably received.
In December 1993, the government lowered tax rates on
filtered cigarettes to 60%, and the non-filter cigarette
rate to 45% [6]. Since 1994, only the Parliament of
U k r a i n eh a st h ep o w e r st oc h a n g et a xr a t e s ,w h i l et h e
government and Members of Parliament (MP) may sub-
mit their proposals on changing the rates. In February
1994, the Parliament lowered excise rates to 50% and
35% respectively. But even this turned out to be too lit-
tle, and in October 1994 the rates were adopted at a
level of 40% for filtered cigarettes and 10% for non-filter
cigarettes. Production of cigarettes in Ukraine increased
from 42 billion sticks in 1993 to 48 billion sticks in
1995 - only a 12% increase (Fig. 1). Such a small
increase could not compensate revenue losses through
the lowering of tax rates [6].
1995-1998: Ukrainian authorities were increasing tobacco
tax rates, ignoring tobacco industry positions
In 1995 the Ukrainian authorities recognized that meet-
ing TTCs taxation proposals did not provide the pro-
m i s e dr e s u l t s .T h e nT T C su s e daf r o n tg r o u pt o
intervene in taxation policy in Ukraine. Back in 1992 it
was decided to “establish excise advisory team to offer
advice to Governments; possibly using Deloitte assis-
tance” [25,26]. In September 1995, professional services
company Deloitte and Touche issued a report in Ukrai-
nian titled “Research of possible ways to increase State
budget revenues from tobacco products taxation in
Ukraine” [27,28]. The report’s proposals were to
increase rates for non-filter cigarettes from 10 to 20%,
while decreasing rates for filter cigarettes from 40 to
20%. The report promised that with such rates TTC
would increase their investments to filter cigarette pro-
duction and eventually it would provide the equivalent
of an additional $174 million (US) in excise revenues for
the next 5 years.
In February 1996, the Parliament imposed taxes on fil-
tered cigarettes at the level of 2 ECU (European Cur-
rency Unit was used before the euro) per 1000
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porarily set at 0.5 ECU in 1996 and 1 ECU in 1997.
This meant that excise duty increased approximately
1.3-fold for filtered cigarettes and 2-fold for non-filter
cigarettes [6].
In July 1996, the Ukrainian Tobacco Association
claimed that “the adopted rate level destroys the domes-
tic tobacco industry” and proposed to decrease the level
of excise duty both for filtered and non-filter cigarettes
[6]. This proposal was substantiated with the expecta-
tion that an increase in filtered cigarette production
would allegedly increase aggregate budget revenues.
However due to increases in excise rates, budget rev-
enues from tobacco taxation in 1996 totalled 53 million
Ukrainian Hryvnas (UAH) compared to annual projec-
tion of 23 million UAH. For the four year period of tax
increases over 1996-1999, the total revenue from
tobacco excise was $342 million (US) which was almost
$300 million (US) more than would have been raised
under the old taxation system, while Deloitte and
Toche’s proposals promised only $174 million (US) for
five years.
In 1996-1998, TTCs mainly tried to stop additional
tax rate increases. In 1996, the tax rate for plain (non-
filter) cigarettes was 4 times lower than for filter cigar-
ettes and the BAT objective on excise was to “influence
the Government and Parliament to hold the excise tax
for plain cigarettes in line with the low purchasing power
of the rural consumer” [29]. The RJR document [30]
reports, that in October 1997: “Proposals of the Ukrai-
nian government to incorporate an additional increase of
excise tax and customs duty for all kinds of tobacco pro-
ducts by 0.5 ECU were rejected by the parliament. The
position of the industry was taken into account”.
In 1998, Government Ministries had different posi-
tions on tobacco taxation. A PM document [31] indi-
cated: “The Ministry of Finance proposes to retain the
current fully specific one tier structure and to increase
the rate from 2 to 3 ECU per thousand cigarettes. The
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade pro-
poses to make no changes to excise rate or structure but,
instead, to increase the import duty from 2.5 to between
3 and 3.5 ECU per thousand cigarettes. The Ministry of
Economy proposes to retain the existing structure and
existing rate levels for both excise taxes and import duty.
Area continues to support the Ministry of Economy pro-
posals”. As usual, PM supported the lowest rates.
TTCs could have different positions on tax rates
depending on their brand portfolio. TTC Reemtsma,
which was the main producer of non-filter cigarettes,
proposed to decrease non-filter cigarettes rates from 2
to 1.5 ECU, while to increase filter cigarettes rates from
Figure 1 Cigarette production and revenues in Ukraine in 1992-2000. Production (bln. cigarettes). Inflation-adjusted tobacco excise
revenues (mln.UAH) 1995 is a basic year.
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the proposal because it would lead to a substantial
reduction of state budget revenue“ [31].
In June 1998 the Government proposed to increase
excise rates for tobacco products. BAT meeting with
PMI and RJR, representatives discussed the steps to be
taken by tobacco companies. They prepared “informa-
tion based on economic calculations, which will show
that such a decision will not lead to big contributions to
the budget but, on the contrary, will lead to increase
contraband and breakdown of Ukraine’s tobacco indus-
try“ [32].
However, in August 1998 tax rates were increased to 3
ECU for filter cigarettes and 2.3 ECU for non-filter
cigarettes. But in two weeks the notorious August 1998
fiscal crisis occurred and tax rates (in UAH) almost
doubled. That is why in December 1998, the parliament
changed the rates to 2.5 ECU per 1000 cigarettes. In
1998, excise rates per 1000 cigarettes increased from 4.2
UAH in January to 10 UAH in December. The nominal
government revenues increased to 129 million UAH in
1997 and 287 million UAH in 1998 [6]. Government
again had got a benefited by rejecting tobacco industry
proposals on tobacco taxation reform.
In 1999, the Parliament adopted new laws to intro-
duce a special 5% tax on cigarettes earmarked for the
country’s Pension Fund. PM’s documents [33,34]
demonstrate a negative tobacco industry attitude
towards this law. However, the tax was in place until
2004 and contributed some 700 million UAH to the
Pension Fund.
During 1996-1998 the Ukrainian authorities, despite
apparent tobacco industry resistance, increased tobacco
excise rates several times and every time it was very
beneficial for the tax revenue. In real (inflation-adjusted)
terms, tax revenues in 1995-1999 increased by 14 times,
while production increased only by 12% (Fig. 1). In
1997-1999 cigarette price index exceeded the inflation
rate, so the real price for cigarette became higher and
higher. Over this period, demand for tobacco products
decreased, with clear benefits for public health in
Ukraine.
1999-2000: Tobacco industry managed to stop tax rate
increases
In 1999, tax rates for non-filter cigarettes were much
higher in Ukraine than in neighbouring Russia which
prompted bootlegging of Russian cigarettes to Ukraine.
The TTCs in their public statements intentionally exag-
gerated amounts of smuggled cigarettes [6] and made
reference to the situation to lobby tax rate reduction [35].
According to the BAT CORA’s( C o r p o r a t ea n dR e g u -
latory Affairs unit) Budget Proposals for 1999, $140,000
(US) were allocated for lobbying on tobacco taxation in
Ukraine [36]. A seminar for senior government officials
was also organised to present BAT’sp r o p o s a l so n
tobacco tax [37]. BAT in Ukraine also organised a visit
for Ukrainian ministers, parliamentarians and customs
officials to the UK and Germany to examine tax struc-
tures in those countries [38].
In November 1999, the Parliament introduced the
tobacco tax rate in local currency - 10 UAH per 1000
filter cigarettes and 7 UAH per 1000 non-filter cigar-
ettes. Actually, the tax was reduced from 2.5 ECU both
for filter and non-filter cigarettes to 2.07 ECU for filter
cigarettes and 1.45 ECU for non-filter cigarettes. The
period of tobacco tax rates increases was over although
excise revenues in 1999 reached 522 million UAH. In
2000, despite cigarette production increases, only 444
million UAH was raised from tobacco excise [6]. In real
terms, revenues (including the Pension Fund payments)
decreased by 20% (Fig. 1).
In 2000, BAT developed excise policy proposals that
suggested maintaining a stable tax burden for 3-5 years,
and before starting proposed a “period of stability” during
which the excise rate should be reduced to 8.0 UAH per
1000 cigarettes [39]. However the Government proposed
increasing excise rates from 10 to 13.5 UAH. BAT con-
ducted successful lobbying to keep the rate [40].
2000-2007: Fighting around excise structure to prevent
excise increase
In 2000-2007, the total excise incidence changes were
small but the structure of excise was changed several
times. Those TTCs that mainly produce cheap cigarettes
(BAT and Reemtsma) preferred advalorem taxes, while
producers of mainly expensive cigarettes (PM and JTI)
preferred specific taxes. In 2003, PM and JTI urged
keeping the existing specific tax system, forecasting
smuggling increases and revenue decreases should a
mixed taxation system be adopted [41]. However in
2004, all TTCs operating in Ukraine (PM, JTI, BAT,
Reemtsma and Gallaher) issued a joint statement sug-
gesting the maintenance of the existing taxation struc-
ture. They stated that mixed excise system, which did
enter into force in 2004, “meets state revenues interests
and provides stable framework for constant development
of tobacco industry in Ukraine“ [42]. The statement was
caused by the submission of proposals to increase tax
rates for the international brands. The threat of a real
increase in excise rates seemed to make TTCs forget
their previously articulated arguments for a more “bene-
ficial” taxation system. The parliament supported tax
rate increases, but the President of Ukraine vetoed the
law [43].
In 2005, the Government proposed to increase adva-
lorem excise rates from 7% to 8% and to establish a
minimum tax requirement, not in the specific, but in
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her) urged to keep the current tobacco excise structure,
[44] again forecasting that smuggling would increase if
the current tobacco tax system changed. However BAT
did not oppose the new system as it was more beneficial
for its brand portfolio and total tax increase was very
moderate.
In 2006, the authorities proposed to increase excise
rates. TTCs claimed: “the companies should pay 470 mil-
lion UAH of taxes more, than with existing rates” and
opposed the changes, again forecasting dire predictions of
increases in rates of smuggling [45]. The excise was not
increased, and it turned out, that the government actually
spent 470 million UAH on fighting alleged smuggling.
In 2007, the Ministry of Finance proposed to raise
excise rates and there were no protests from the TTCs
[46] as the suggested excise increase was essentially
below the inflation level.
During 2001-2007 tobacco excise changes in Ukraine
were mainly determined by the competitive interests of
the TTCs. Real (inflation-adjusted) cigarette prices
decreased. The lowering cost of cigarettes was one of
the main causes of smoking prevalence increase those
years [47]. In 2001-2007 the inflation-adjusted revenues
increased only in parallel with cigarette production
growth (Fig. 2).
2008: The excise increase brings one billion to state
coffers
In 2008 some MPs proposed essential increases in
tobacco excise rates in Ukraine. TTCs opposed these
proposals, again predicting the growth of smuggling to
Ukraine and a slump in production that allegedly would
lead to reduction in revenues. Contrary to the tobacco
industry opinion, the parliament approved 1.5-2 fold
cigarette excise increase, effective of September 1, 2008.
Tobacco industry representatives issued negative com-
ments concerning the bill,[48] repeating arguments that
the new excise would lead to cigarette smuggling from
Russia. However in July 2008 the BAT representative
confirmed that cigarette prices in Russia exceeded
Ukrainian prices by 20% [49]. Thus, the recent tax
increase in Ukraine just narrowed price differential with
Russia, and, according to the tobacco industry claims,
narrowing such differential is the main instrument to
prevent smuggling. A JTI representative declared, that
the government would not receive a planned additional
1.1 billion UAH in revenue from the excise increase, but
only 0.5 billion UAH [50]. Eventually the Government
had got more than 1 billion UAH additional revenues
just within the last four months of 2008, contrary to the
industry’s forecasts. Cigarette price increases in 2008
were above inflation rates and inflation-adjusted revenue
increases exceeded the production growth (Fig. 2).
Discussion
During all the years of their presence in Ukraine, TTCs
have used a range of strategies to influence tobacco taxa-
tion with the aim to «manage taxation to our benefit»
[51]. Their main taxation strategy was rather consistent -
«the lobbying strategy is to keep excise as low as possible»
[40]. and while in the internal documents this strategy is
expressed in clear terms, it was not mentioned at all in
the TTC’s public statements. This paper reveals that self
interest has driven TTC’s taxation activities in Ukraine.
In those cases where authorities in Ukraine ignored
TTC opinion and established higher excise rates than it
was suggested by the TTCs, and made tobacco prices to
increase above the inflation level, revenues increased. In
other countries, governments also often ignored tobacco
industry vested interests in taxation policies. In 2001
BAT had to admit that “the current FCTC process will
encourage the momentum towards higher taxation” and
“governments will increasingly improve their understand-
ing of the economics of the industry and will seek to
maximise their overall revenues from the industry” [52].
The findings of this paper may help to encourage the
development of tobacco taxation in line with FCTC
principles. Consideration must be given to reversing the
strategies of the tobacco industry on tobacco taxation,
as these have been shown to be self serving. Increasing
tax rates can contribute to the health objectives through
reducing tobacco consumption. The main principles of
public health-oriented taxation policy can be formulated
as: 1) keep excise as high as possible and 2) tax
increases need to ensure that retail price of tobacco pro-
ducts increase above rates of inflation.
The findings reveal some contradictions and conflicts
between different TTCs as they tried to use the struc-
ture of excise as a competition tool. BAT described its
competitor’s international activities in the following
way:[53] «Philip Morris will continue to campaign for
specific taxation in order to support its premium-seg-
ment brand focus, selling the concept to governments pri-
marily on the basis of the attributes of consistency and
simplicity. Philip Morris’s lobbying activities on this
issue will be particularly aggressive in new investment
markets». However, PM campaign for specific taxation
should not be misinterpreted as a campaign for specific
tax rates increase, as real PM approach is to “increase
specific portion of excise tax structures, without increas-
ing total tax incidence” [15]. While in some countries
BAT can oppose such approach it recognizes that «the
optimum balance between specific and ad valorem will
depend upon the brand mix of each company“ [14]. In
Ukraine conflicts between TTCs over tax structures
sometimes became public to hide their real aim to
change tax structures without increasing total tax
incidence.
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ture reflecting the market position and nature of their
brands, in Ukraine TTCs usually ignored these differ-
ences, when some initiative on real tax increase
emerged, to fight as an industry against it. For public
health, the optimum balance between specific and ad
valorem will depend on the economic and political
situation in the country and there is no single formula
to calculate such balance. In Ukraine both pure speci-
fic excise (in late 1990s) and mixed excise (in 2008)
proved to be able to increase real cigarette prices and
revenues. Tobacco control advocates can have different
positions with regard to which tax structure better
serves public health aims, however, these differences
are much less important than total tax incidence
increase. If policy makers submit taxation proposals
that would result in increasing tobacco prices above
inflation, public health advocates should consider
supporting such proposals even if proposed tax struc-
ture seems not to be optimal one.
TTCs constantly use the threat of smuggling to keep
excise low and sometimes this perceived threat prevents
authorities from being willing to increase tobacco tax
rates. When proposing tax increases, public health advo-
cates should calculate different scenarios concerning
cigarette smuggling both into the country and out of the
country to ascertain that proposed tax increases will be
beneficial for revenues even in the worst (but real) sce-
nario. If tax rates are increased, the impact of such
increases on revenues, consumption and smuggling
should be monitored to demonstrate inadequacy of
tobacco industry forecasts and to encourage authorities
to continue to take action to raise tobacco taxes into
the future.
Tobacco industry’s documents confirm the effective-
ness of large cigarette excise tax increases as a policy for
governments in their efforts to reduce tobacco use [53].
BAT admitted that «higher taxes imply higher consumer
prices, which will impact sales volumes negatively»a n d
«there will be continuing pressure on governments for
higher tax rates on cigarettes and other tobacco products,
arising from both anti-smoking pressure groups and gen-
eral state budgetary concerns (with international agen-
cies e.g. World Bank, IMF, WHO, continuing to be
influential in pressing for such increases)» [54].
The tobacco industry recognises that tobacco taxation
is a key component in national tobacco control efforts
and, if we look to evidence from the Ukraine, has
attempted to undermine or subvert its effectiveness.
Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the
FCTC on the protection of public health policies with
respect to tobacco control from commercial and other
Figure 2 Cigarette production and revenues in Ukraine in 2001-2008. Production (bln. cigarettes). Inflation-adjusted tobacco excise
revenues (mln.UAH) 2001 is a basic year.
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fully applied to tobacco taxation policy development.
According to the Guidelines, as it is not strictly neces-
sary for the authorities to interact with the tobacco
industry to effectively regulate tobacco taxes, such inter-
actions should be avoided.
Conclusions
The FCTC includes provisions both on tobacco taxation
policy and on protection of public health policy from
vested interests of tobacco industry. This paper provides
arguments why tobacco taxation policy should also be
protected from vested interests of tobacco industry. The
transnational tobacco companies’ main taxation strategy
is consistent: to keep excise as low as possible. While in
their public statements tobacco companies do not dis-
close this strategy, this aim was clear in the industry
documents reviewed in preparing this paper.
Apparent conflicts between TTCs concerning tax
structures often hide their real aim to change tax struc-
tures for competing interests without increasing total
tax incidence.
The study gives grounds for governments, which cares
for the population health and filling of the budget, not
to allow tobacco companies to influence the tobacco
taxation policy. Tobacco tax increases directly benefit
governments through increased revenues and they are
effective in reducing tobacco use. The reduction in
tobacco use, however, is against the vested interests of
tobacco companies and they seem to be willing to make
considerable efforts to prevent increase of tobacco taxes.
The paper reviews arguments and tactics tobacco indus-
try uses to keep taxes as low as possible and provides
counter-arguments for developing taxation policy so as
to contribute to the health objectives through reducing
tobacco consumption.
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